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Economic Sustainability and Intergenerational Fairness: 
A New Taxonomy of Indicators 
by Róbert I. Gál and Judit Monostori
graphic transition, which is characterised by the combination of 
low fertility and increasing life expectancy. Ageing societies face 
problems of financing their large intergenerational transfer pro-
grammes. Alternatively, they have to come to terms with the fact 
that currently young and future cohorts must accept significantly 
worse conditions, which translates the problem of sustainability 
into the terms of intergenerational fairness. The connection be-
tween the two concepts is intuitive even though both sustaina-
bility and intergenerational fairness have various definitions and 
reference points. Many of the indicators measuring the two inter-
linked issues reflect one or the other such reference points.
As population ageing is becoming a growing concern, a number 
of new indicators have been suggested by the research communi-
ty. Currently the problem is not that we do not have indicators 
describing the ageing process and its consequences; the problem 
is we have too many and that they are frequently misinterpreted. 
Besides, we possibly do not have the most meaningful of them 
yet.
Surveying the related literature, we have collected over 80 indi-
cators of which we will refer only to a few in this paper; further 
details can be found in our report.3 This is not the first such col-
lection. The growing number of measurement tools has also led to 
efforts to survey them. Robert Fenge and Martin Werding bring 
together indicators measuring the consequences of population age-
ing for the public pension system and the general government.4 
They organise their findings in two dimensions: by scope (indica-
bstract: The aim of this paper is to facilitate informed 
choice about indicators of economic sustainability and 
intergenerational fairness and decisions about their 
uses. We focus on four issues. First, we found that the same type of 
indicator measured at different levels – such as the general govern-
ment, the (market) economy or the total economy, which includes 
both the market economy and the household economy – often leads 
to different conclusions. Second, sustainability analysis is frequent-
ly built on exogenously set age limits even though it is obvious 
that old age does not everywhere start at age 65; it did not always 
start there where it does today; and most likely it will not start 
there in the future. Third, we use our taxonomy of more than 80 
indicators to spot holes, shortcomings and absences. Fourth, we 
show some structural differences between indicators of sustaina-
bility and fairness.
Keywords: intergenerational indicators, economic sustainability, 
intergenerational fairness, National
Introduction
Economic sustainability and intergenerational fairness are closely 
related issues.1 The problem of sustainability, which includes the 
long-term affordability of public programmes such as health care 
and pensions but in more general terms the subsistence of cur-
rent consumption patterns,2 came to the fore as a result of the 
changing age composition of society during the second demo-
A
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tors applying to specific public programmes, such as the pension 
system, or the entire general government) and by level (whether 
the concept applies at the micro-level, and as such  affects individ-
ual decisions, or at the macro-level). We  explicitly use and extend 
the “scope” dimension of their taxonomy. Jeroen Spijker goes be-
yond the strict focus on the public sector and differentiates among 
indicators by the domains covered, such as purely demographic, 
purely economic, demographic and economic-related, health- and 
disability-related and based on human capital.5 Our subcategories 
in the cross-sectional partitioning owe much to his suggestions.6
We created a notation system and translated each indicator in 
order to make them comparable. We established a taxonomy to 
find overlaps, connections and families of indicators as well as to 
discover holes in the indicator system and facilitate the invention 
of new indicators. The structure of the taxonomy is presented 
in Table 1. We include only those indicators that we describe in 
the paper. The comprehensive classification table completed with 
formal definitions, occasional comments and references can be 
found in the online Appendix (see igjr.org).
This paper is structured so as to focus on some of our conclusions. 
First, we show that the scope of an indicator matters. Conclusions 
of a social process on sustainability and intergenerational fairness 
can be quite different if we limit the analysis to the pension system 
or extend it to the entire economy or beyond. Secondly, we show 
that the indicators in question are based all too often on ad hoc 
partitioning of the life cycle, such as old age defined as a stage of 
life starting at age 65. Instead, we will show indicators that miti-
gate the ad hoc nature of partitioning by endogenising it or elim-
inating it altogether by parametrising the entire age distribution. 
Thirdly, we found that the classification table helps inventing new 
indicators that can be relevant. Fourthly, we will differentiate be-
tween indicators of sustainability and fairness.
Table 1: A taxonomy of indicators of economic sustainability and 
intergenerational fairness7
Scope
The first dimension of our taxonomy is the scope or measurement 
level of the indicator.
We distinguish four such levels, those of 
  specific public programmes, such as education, health care or 
pensions
 the general government8
 the market ecownomy, and
 the total economy, which combines the market economy and 
the household economy.9
Below we present two examples for the use of the “scope” dimen-
sion but we will also refer to its potential later. Both examples 
demonstrate that a population process can spell different conse-
quences on sustainability in various sectors of the economy or 
society. Also, it can shed new light on widely held views on inter-
generational fairness.
The “scope” dimension can be applied to establish families of re-
lated indicators such as the group of support ratios. All members 
of this indicator family include the age distribution of the popula-
tion but in addition to that they also take into account economic 
characteristics. The fiscal support ratio10 weights the demographic 
age distribution by the age profiles of benefits received from, and 
taxes paid to, the general government respectively, and calculates 
the ratio between the resulting numbers of effective taxpayers and 
effective beneficiaries. The pension support ratio does the same but it 
is limited to benefits and contributions of the public pay-as-you-go 
pension system. In contrast, the economic support ratio11 extends the 
scope to the entire market economy and applies per capita age-pro-
files of labour income and consumption as weights. Finally, the total 
support ratio extends the economic support ratio to include age pro-
files of unpaid household labour produced and consumed.
The rationale of connecting related indicators or extending the 
scope of analysis from the pension system to the general govern-
ment to the market economy and finally to the total economy is 
that sustainability conclusions can turn out to be quite different at 
the various levels. In Figure 1 we demonstrate for a sample of se-
lected countries that the dra-
matic unsustainability in the 
pension system can go hand 
in hand with modest or even 
mild sustainability problems 
in the general government 
and the economy in particu-
lar if the household economy 
is also taken into account. 
The columns in the figure 
represent percentage changes 
in the respective support ra-
tios if the 2010 per capita age 
profiles of inflows and out-
flows mentioned above are 
combined with the age dis-
tribution of the population 
in 2060.
Currently the problem is not that we do not have indi­
cators describing the ageing process and its consequen­
ces; the problem is we have too many and that they are 
frequently misinterpreted.
Table 1: A taxonomy of indicators of economic sustainability and intergenerational fairnessi 
 
  Cross-sectional Long time-horizon 
Partitioning of the population by Parametric 
characterisation 
Cohort Population 
Chronological age + Other non-
economic 
characteristics 
+ Other incl. 
economic 
characteristics 
Remaining lifetime Entire lifetime 
Specific public 
programmes 
old-age 
dependency ratio 
  pension support ratio; 
turnover duration 
contribution wealth; 
pension wealth 
net transfer rate contribution 
wealth; implicit 
pension debt; 
pension wealth; 
implicit education 
capital 
General 
government 
   fiscal support ratio human capital 
investment gap 
generational 
imbalance 
sustainability gap 
Market economy    economic support ratio; 
arrow diagram; Silver 
Club 
  consumption 
deficit 
Total economy    total support ratio    
 
A population process can spell different consequences 
on  sustainability in various sectors of the economy or 
society.
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The countries in Figure 1 were selected so as to include the five 
largest nations in the EU and at least one representative of all 
European welfare regimes.12 In each case, the pension support ra-
tio, that is the rate of the number of effective contributors to the 
number of effective pensioners, would take a major negative drop 
of between 23% in Sweden and 39% in Spain should current 
per capita age profiles of contributions and benefits still prevail 
in 2060. This implies serious sustainability problems. However, 
the population pressure on the general government is less severe 
(the fiscal support ratio would decrease between 11% in Sweden 
and 22% in Spain), because the beneficiaries of the general gov-
ernment are less old and its contributors are older than those of 
the pension system. Consequences on the economic support ratio 
would be broadly comparable. More strikingly, if the total econo-
my is considered – which includes the market economy recorded 
in the National Accounts as well as the household economy that 
is the output of unpaid household labour – population ageing 
would not create any negative effect at all on the support ratio. 
The age profile of consumption is so much younger, and that 
of labour is so much older in the household economy13 that the 
resulting decrease in consumption and growth in labour would 
compensate for the imbalances of the market economy.14
Figure 1: Changes in various support ratios if per capita age profiles of 
the public sector and the economy in 2010 are applied to the expected 
2060 age distribution in selected European populations (%)15, 16
In short, population ageing affects the pension (and health care) 
systems seriously and these institutions require major reforms, 
but societies on the whole are exposed to smaller pressure and 
consequently they have the necessary resources to mobilise when 
confronted with the later phases of the demographic transition. 
Such findings based on data-intensive but simple indicators are in 
line with results produced by more complex models. Ronald Lee, 
Andrew Mason and their co-authors17 show that intergenerational 
reallocations of different scope, such as the general government 
or the market economy, imply different levels of optimal fertil-
ity, and although current fertility levels are insufficient to main-
tain inter-age transfers conveyed by government in industrialised 
countries, they are not far from what is required for maintaining 
current consumption levels.
Our other example for the merits of using families of indicators 
based on the variation of scope rather than single indicators is the 
pro-elderly bias in public spending. As it has been demonstrated, 
(1) currently older persons receive more public transfers than in 
past decades; (2) the elderly population receive more than chil-
dren; and (3) the elderly/children public transfer ratio has been 
increasing.18 However, these observations, while true, ignore oth-
er transfers and are limited to the public sector. If the scope of 
measurement is expanded to the level of the market economy and 
further to the total economy the conclusion reverses. In Figure 2 
we show per capita values of three transfer packages. The curves 
represent 17 European countries covering 85% of the EU popu-
lation. For the sake of cross-country comparability, values are re-
scaled by the per capita labour income of the 30–49 year-old pop-
ulation. The first package is net public transfers (taxes paid, less 
transfers and public services received) at the level of the general 
government. The shape of the continuous curve confirms pro-el-
derly bias: the elderly population gets significantly higher per cap-
ita net transfers through public channels than children do. How-
ever, if net private, mostly intra-familial transfers of market goods 
and services are taken into account – that is, the scope is extended 
to the market economy – the pro-elderly bias disappears (see the 
dotted line in Figure 2). Finally, when net transfers of the value of 
unpaid household labour are also included – that is, the analysis is 
extended to the level of the total economy – children receive more 
transfers per capita than the elderly (dashed line in Figure 2). The 
pattern is repeated in each of the 17 sampled countries.
In short, as first noted by Gál, Vanhuysse and Vargha,19 children 
receive more, not less, transfers per capita than the elderly popu-
lation. The “age-bias” of public transfers – a child/elderly ratio of 
0.4 measured in terms of per capita transfers – balances out at the 
level of the national economy (taking a value of 1.1), and revers-
es (with the ratio of 2.4) if transfers of the household economy 
are also taken into account.20 However, children receive most of 
their transfers from their family in forms unrecorded by current 
statistical standards and consequently invisible for much of the 
analysis of intergenerational relations, whereas the old population 
is supported through well documented, mostly public, channels.21
Figure 2: Per capita values of various transfer packages in the 
 European Union22, 23
This result significantly modifies the one-sided narrative of inter-
generational transfers as a sneaky grab for resources by the old. 
The frequent references on “gerontocracy” and the growing “grey 
Children receive most of their transfers from their family 
in forms unrecorded by current statistical standards 
and consequently invisible for much of the analysis of 
intergenerational relations, whereas the old population 
is supported through well documented, mostly public, 
channels.
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power” are limited to the statistically visible world of public trans-
fers and largely ignore intra-familial transfers of cash and time. 
The more complete picture based on a family of related indica-
tors is consistent with an alternative narrative of intergenerational 
developments. The growing public share of resources flowing to 
older persons may well have gone in parallel with increasing so-
cietal resources for the young. Higher public transfers to elderly 
recipients may turn out to be a form of compensation for lost 
private and time transfers mostly due to lower co-habitation lev-
els with adult children. Notwithstanding elderly bias in public 
spending, the twentieth century may also have been the Century 
of the Child, as Ellen Key (1909) predicted at its start.24
We cannot address such questions at this stage. We only used the 
two examples to demonstrate that families of related indicators 
frequently can tell more about sustainability and fairness than 
single indicators and sometimes even question widely held per-
ceptions. The quest for the best indicator may turn out to be the 
quest for the best family of indicators.
Partitioning versus parametric characterisation of age 
 distributions
Support ratios are cross-sectional indicators (see Table 1), which 
take their values from one period of time, t. This t is not neces-
sarily the current period: it can be in the past or in the future. 
As a matter of fact, cross-sectional indicators are frequently ap-
plied in projections. However, even if t takes place in the future, 
a cross-sectional indicator takes the value of one period at a time 
(or potentially a compound of two such measures) irrespective 
of where this period is in the timeline. In contrast, what we call 
long time-horizon indicators sum up information of the base pe-
riod, t, as well as subsequent periods in one indicator. Whenever 
cross-sectional indicators are applied to characterise the future, 
they refer to the future. In contrast, long time-horizon indicators 
as present values include references to the future even when they 
are used to characterise the present. Cross-sectional indicators 
are central tendencies (medians or means), rates or subtractions 
whereas long time-horizon indicators are built on summations or 
integrals over a specified time period.
Most cross-sectional indicators partition the age distribution and 
compare its sections with each other (in the first three columns of 
Table 1). This is the most populous group in our collection (even if 
not in Table 1, but see the online Appendix for details). The most 
frequently used partitioning is the triad of childhood, active or 
working age, and old age. All related indicators are based on some 
simple or more chiselled definition of the three life stages. Some of 
them cover part of the population such as the various beneficiaries/
contributors (or benefits/contributions) ratios characterising pen-
sion systems. Others range over the entire population including 
children as well. Partitioning of the age distribution can be based 
purely on age but more sophisticated partitioning methods include 
other pieces of information. They can be monetary, but they can 
refer to other conditions such as health, level of education, labour 
market position or some institutional conditions as well. 
Partitioning in its most frequent form cuts the life cycle at ex-
ternally given demarcation ages, such as 15 years as the age of 
becoming adult and 65 years as the age of growing old. Such a 
simplification eases cross-country comparisons or projections but 
also distorts the results. The shift from childhood to adult life 
or from working age to old age occurs at different ages across 
countries and changes over time. An old man in Africa is not 
necessarily old in Sweden; a 16 year-old woman could have been 
easily a housewife in ancient Rome but she would be considered a 
child in modern-day Italy.
In a series of papers Warren Sanderson and Sergei Scherbov over-
come this problem by introducing the concept of characteris-
tic age.25 They offer a general framework that translates various 
characteristics of people to years of age. Such characteristics can 
vary over a wide range of frequently used measures of population 
ageing, including variants of remaining life expectancy, such as 
prospective old age thresholds for the entire population or various 
social groups (the average age of a social group at which their 
remaining life expectancy is a given threshold of years, usually 15 
years) or the prospective median age (the age of a person in a pop-
ulation who sees as many people with higher and as many people 
with lower life expectancy than his/her own); survival probabili-
ties, such as the probability of surviving the next five years; health 
conditions of the population as a whole (such as the proportion 
of self-reported good/bad health) or that of various social groups 
(such as the average hand-grip strength).
The translation procedure requires two characteristic schedules. 
Average chronological ages of various social groups in a fixed 
age-specific characteristic schedule are related to chronological 
ages, called alpha ages, in another, variable characteristic sched-
ule. With some simplification, this re-mapping creates iso-age 
contours by selecting the age equivalents of chronological ages 
in the variable characteristic schedule. Fixed schedules can be as 
different as a pre-set remaining life expectancy (such as 15 years); 
some demographic characteristic of a reference group, such as one 
of the two sexes, a nation, a group with a given level of education 
or a group in a given year. Variable schedules can be cross-country 
differences; changes over time or differences by age within one 
social group.
Sanderson and Scherbov collect a number of striking examples. 
Whereas the 15-year prospective old age threshold rapidly in-
creased between 1960 and 2010 in East Asia (by nearly 12 years 
in China and nearly 11 years in Japan), the mortality crisis in 
Russia resulted in a stagnation. In a more colloquial language, 
66 was the new 54 in China; 73 was the new 62 in Japan; but 64 
remained 64 in Russia if old age was defined as the age when the 
remaining life expectancy is 15 years. Another example is medi-
an-aged Mexicans who were older in 2010 as compared to 1960, 
but they were further away from their death in that their remain-
ing life expectancy was longer than their counterparts’ fifty years 
before. In a similar way, iso-age contours can be drawn by level 
of education or self-reported health. As Sanderson and Scherbov 
show, the gender difference in life expectancies vary much more 
by education in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe, so high-
The frequent references on “gerontocracy” and the grow­
ing “grey power” are limited to the statistically visible 
world of public transfers and largely ignore intra­familial 
transfers of cash and time.
The shift from childhood to adult life or from working 
age to old age occurs at different ages across countries 
and changes over time.
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ly educated Eastern Europeans become old more or less at the 
same age as Western Europeans but the demarcation line between 
working age and old age runs at a significantly lower age among 
poorly educated Eastern Europeans.
Other cross-sectional indicators circumvent the problem of ad 
hoc partitioning by avoiding it altogether. Such indicators give a 
parametric characterisation of the entire age distribution by com-
prising information in one parameter, such as a weighted mean 
(column 4 in Table 1). Support ratios mentioned in the previous 
section belong in this group. Another example of this type is the 
arrow diagram sometimes called the Lee arrow after its inven-
tor.26 It is built on parametric characterisations of two related age 
profiles. It is the difference between the mean age of consumers 
weighted by the amount of their consumption and the mean age 
of workers weighted by their labour income. It takes the shape 
of an arrow in its graphical representation of intergenerational 
relations (see Figure 3). It has a direction (depending on whether 
consumers or workers are older), length (depending on the age 
difference) and width (the current amount of per capita con-
sumption). If it is negative (in a graphical representation an arrow 
points to the left), consumers are younger than workers, or in a 
longitudinal interpretation consumption precedes production; if 
it is positive (the arrow points to the right), workers are younger 
than consumers and it is production that precedes consumption.
For illustration we present a young and an old society, Indonesia 
and Germany, in Figure 3. In order to give the order of magnitude 
of the arrows we show consumption (C in the figure; shown by 
the dotted lines) and labour income (YL; by continuous lines) by 
age. Both are per capita values and measured on the right-hand 
axes of the panels. However, the direction of the arrow can only 
be derived from population-weighted values of consumption and 
labour income. They are presented as shaded areas and measured 
on the left-hand scales.
The dominant effect in young societies is that consumers build 
up debts in order to finance their consumption. Such a debt can 
be an implicit or even informal intra-familial debt. In contrast, 
the dominant effect in an old society is that of saving and wealth 
accumulation. Robert Willis,27 and in a more general setting Ron-
ald Lee,28 show that, assuming a stable population, the area of 
the arrow diagram gives an indication of the per capita demand 
for life-cycle wealth or, with some simplification, debt or wealth 
accumulation in the future. As such, the Lee arrow is a simple and 
powerful tool for sustainability analysis.
A direct application of the arrow diagram for population ageing 
is membership in the Silver Club.29 A society becomes a member 
of the Silver Club at the moment its Lee arrow changes direction 
and consumers grow older than producers. In Table 2, we pres-
ent the directions and lengths of the arrow diagram for selected 
European countries, the European Union as a whole, as well as 
other regions of the World. The names of Silver Club members 
are shown in bold.30
Table 2: Weighted mean ages of consumers and workers and the 
lengths and directions of the resulting Lee arrows31, 32
Silver Club membership signals an important stage of population 
ageing when the first demographic dividend is about to turn neg-
ative and the phase for harvesting a potential second dividend is 
about to open. The first dividend is a consequence of the tempo-
rarily growing proportion of working-age population just when 
rapid population growth stops and cohorts larger than the cohorts 
of their parents start to have fewer children. This period creates 
opportunities for higher labour supply (as child-raising does not 
demand so much work any longer) and for higher consumption 
and investments (as fewer children have to be raised by potentially 
more workers). This dividend is positive as long as the relatively 
large cohorts are in working age, and turns negative once they 
retire. However, there is a chance for a prolongation of growth. 
If the additional resources due to higher labour supply and less 
downward transfers to children are saved rather than consumed, 
a second dividend can be harvested. Silver Club membership sig-
A society becomes a member of the Silver Club at the 
moment its Lee arrow changes direction and consumers 
grow older than producers.
 
mean age of  
consumer 
mean age of  
worker 
length and direction 
of the Lee arrow  
Germany 46.7 43.9 2.7 
Spain 42.3 42.0 0.3 
France 43.3 42.2 1.1 
Italy 45.1 43.8 1.3 
Sweden 43.4 44.5 -1.1 
UK 44.1 42.6 1.5 
European Union 42.3 42.4 -0.1 
US 41.8 44.0 -2.2 
East Asia 36.8 40.5 -3.7 
Latin America 33.9 40.0 -6.1 
South and South 
East Asia 31.2 39.4 -8.2 
Africa 26.1 39.5 -13.4 
 
Figure 3: Per capita and aggregate labour income (YL) and consump-
tion (C) by age and the resulting arrow diagram in a young and an 
old society45
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nals this opportunity, which is, unlike the automatism of the first 
dividend, if not more than that, an opportunity. Its realisation 
depends on the quality of public policies, the reliability of the 
financial sector and the willingness of the public to save.
Another closely related indicator, called in pension economics the 
turnover duration of a pay-as-you-go scheme, is a counterpart of 
the Lee arrow with a narrower scope.33 In this context, turnover 
duration is the difference between the average age of pensioners 
weighted by the amount of their benefits and the average age 
of contributors weighted by the amount of their contributions. 
The distance of the two weighted means indicates the average 
length of “maturation” of contributions in a notional account of 
a non-financial defined contribution system.34 In other words it 
signals the average time that contributions “spend” in the “accu-
mulation phase” in a notionally funded scheme. Multiplied by 
the period amount of contributions, it gives an indication of the 
accumulating stock of contributions of the system. Expressed in 
an alternative way, it reflects the amount of notional wealth held 
by the pension system. Differences between turnover durations 
reflect the variance in the underlying age distribution as well as 
in employment patterns. One of the potential applications of the 
indicators is the automatic balance mechanism of the indexation 
formula used in the Swedish public pension system.35 The formu-
la in question adjusts benefits of retirees and the notional wealth 
of contributors in an annual, incremental way in order to assure 
smooth and continuous adjustment to a sustainable path.
Absentees: missing companions of existing indicators
As shown in Table 1, the turnover duration, a cross-sectional indi-
cator, is related to the contribution wealth, or the present value of 
future contributions of a pay-as-you-go system, which is an indi-
cator with a time-horizon. They are two approaches to quantifying 
the same thing, a stock of wealth building up from a future stream 
of revenues. The turnover duration is based on stronger assump-
tions and as such applies no references to the future.36 The contri-
bution wealth even in its simplest form contains a discount factor. 
It is a constituent part of an increasingly popular sustainability in-
dicator, the implicit pension debt (IPD).37 This name refers to three 
related indicators. Accrued-to-date liabilities is the present value of 
future pensions based on eligibilities collected by plan members so 
far. It gives the cost of closing the system now. No new contribu-
tions are expected to be paid into the system, consequently no new 
eligibilities emerge. Closed-system liabilities is the present value of 
future benefits less the present value of future contributions (the 
contribution wealth introduced above) of plan members who have 
paid so far. This measure contains future contributions and new 
obligations arising from such future contributions. The imaginary 
institutional setting underlying this interpretation is closing the 
pension system for new entrants. Finally, open-system liabilities is 
the net of the two present values of future streams of benefits and 
contributions on condition that the system lasts forever.
The concept of IPD has become rather influential in recent years. It 
left the academic circles and the research community and it is on the 
way to becoming a standard statistical tool regularly published by 
official agencies. However, we are not aware of any calculations of 
its potential counterparts, concepts like an implicit education capital 
or implicit health capital. We added them to Table 1 but set them in 
italics as they have not been established yet. Both would quantify 
human capital that has been created and can be mobilised in the fu-
ture to extend working lives and in this way counterbalance the im-
plicit debt of a pay-as-you-go scheme. It is intuitive that investments 
in education and health have an impact on effective retirement age 
decades later. However, a budget-planning procedure armed with 
the IPD indicator but having no measures of implicit education 
capital and implicit health capital would give the red signal to addi-
tional investments in education or health care. The current versions 
of IPD reflect human capital investments only indirectly, in the 
form of an exogenously chosen growth rate of productivity, and so 
they do not reflect growth in the human capital base of the pension 
system induced by additional education or health spending. Clearly, 
an otherwise rich and useful indicator such as the IPD, employed in 
this way, would trigger wrong policies.
As the name suggests, IPD applies to a specific public programme. 
It can be generalised and defined with a larger scope. The equiv-
alent of open-system liabilities at the level of the general govern-
ment is called the sustainability gap.38 It is the present value of 
expected aggregate future imbalances of the tax-transfer system 
and it is frequently applied as a by-product of generational ac-
counting. We will briefly return to this below.
In principle, the sustainability gap can be further generalised at 
the level of the economy although we have not found reference 
to such an indicator in the literature. Nevertheless, an indicator 
with a related content could be invented. It would be a sort of ac-
cumulating consumption deficit defined as the difference between 
the present values of future consumption and future labour in-
come (or potentially, future primary income, which also includes 
revenues from capital and property). It would give the amount of 
future consumption unfunded by labour (and, in the alternative 
definition, capital). This indicator is also set in italics in Table 1. 
The relationship between the consumption deficit and the arrow 
diagram of the previous section resembles the relationship men-
tioned above between the contribution wealth and the turnover 
duration, although the fact that consumers can be both younger 
and older than workers (the arrow diagram can change direction) 
– whereas contributors are always younger than beneficiaries – 
makes some differences. The consumption deficit with a content 
outlined above would be relevant in sustainability discussions and 
indirectly in intergenerational issues as well. A sizeable consump-
tion deficit indicates that the life path of future generations will be 
different from that of currently living generations.
Calculations pointing to an indicator such as the one called here 
consumption deficit have been suggested. They differ in the way 
the consumption deficit is balanced. Eshan Khoman and Martin 
Weale39 calculate the additional savings required in maintaining 
current consumption patterns in France, Italy, Spain and the UK. 
An alternative way of filling the gap is higher fertility. Ronald Lee, 
The concept of IPD has become rather influential in 
recent years. It left the academic circles and the research 
community and it is on the way to becoming a standard 
statistical tool regularly published by official agencies.
In this context, turnover duration is the difference 
between the average age of pensioners weighted by the 
amount of their benefits and the average age of contrib­
utors weighted by the amount of their contributions. 
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Andrew Mason and their co-authors,40 mentioned before, present 
the fertility rates required to reserve current consumption patterns 
in a sample of 40 countries. Both models can serve as a base for 
creating indicators related to the consumption deficit.
Sustainability versus fairness
In Table 1, we distinguished among long time-horizon indicators 
between those referring to a cohort or the entire population. Con-
clusions based on one or the other are rather different. Whereas 
indicators containing information on the entire population all at 
once are applied in sustainability analysis, cohort figures can also 
serve for intergenerational comparisons and in this way the analy-
sis of intergenerational fairness. Although some indicators can be 
interpreted both at cohort level and at population level, the anal-
yses they are applied in are different. Our example here is pension 
wealth, sometimes called social security wealth, an indicator with 
frequent references in the academic literature41 but also used by 
international agencies such as the OECD. Pension wealth is the 
expected present value of the future stream of benefits in a pay-as-
you-go pension scheme. Defined as a system-level indicator, it is 
the same as the above-mentioned accrued-to-date interpretation of 
the implicit pension debt or the liability side of the other two in-
terpretations. However, pension wealth can also characterise a co-
hort. Such an indicator can be useful in the analysis of the wealth 
portfolio of members of pay-as-you-go schemes as well as in the 
explanation of saving behaviour. Cohorts counting on sufficient 
pension wealth may behave differently than cohorts having no 
such wealth components in their portfolio. Also, pension wealth 
by cohort can tell winners from losers in a pay-as-you-go system.
Population level indicators hardly contain retrospective informa-
tion. They are typically used in sustainability analyses, which are 
based on current and future data. In special cases “current” may 
be set in the future, as future base years can also be selected, for in-
stance, when the researcher wants to quantify the increasing costs 
for future generations of a postponement of reforms.
By contrast, cohort level indicators are often fed with historical 
data. In fact, this is what distinguishes a proper analysis of in-
tergenerational fairness from a sustainability test. Indeed, the re-
sults of a sustainability study are frequently interpreted in terms 
of intergenerational fairness saying that current patterns are so 
unsustainable that the adjustment will unfairly affect future gen-
erations. While such predictions may sound convincing, proper 
statements on intergenerational fairness cannot be made without 
covering the entire lifetime of cohorts in the comparison, which 
usually requires retrospective data. Proper inter-cohort compari-
sons require data covering the entire life cycles of the cohorts in 
question, often involving the collection of retrospective informa-
tion and projections regarding the future.42
Once such a dataset is prepared, various methods are available to 
quantify intergenerational equity. Such indicators can be based on 
subtractions (net present values of lifetime inflows and outflows 
such as taxes and benefits or labour income and consumption) 
such as the net transfer rate, which projects the net present value of 
lifetime benefits and taxes on lifetime earnings. Alternatively, they 
can be ratios of present values such as the benefit/tax ratio. Such 
calculations have been published for the public pension systems 
of numerous countries but only a handful of net transfer rates of 
the entire tax-transfer system have been calculated so far.43
However, without life-cycle data no real inter-cohort comparisons 
can be made, rendering conclusions on intergenerational fairness 
futile. This is tacitly acknowledged in the generational imbalance, a 
key indicator of generational accounting.44 Although the method is 
based on calculating present values of net taxes through the remain-
ing lifetime of each cohort, currently living and future, generational 
imbalance compares such present values only of the new-born co-
hort and the future generation (future cohorts are not distinguished 
from each other but treated as a single cohort). That is, the imbal-
ance is established between two full lifetimes. Remaining lifetime 
balances of all other living cohorts are neglected by the indicator in 
the end, and are taken into account only in the calculation of what 
is in fact the sustainability gap of the tax-transfer system (see above). 
This gap is what is charged on future generations making their life-
time present values different from that of the new-born. Even this 
acknowledgement by the method makes it difficult to interpret it 
in terms of intergenerational fairness. Generational imbalance com-
pares two highly abstract life cycles after all; it is better interpreted 
as a sustainability measure or as a predictor of reforms.
Conclusions
As population ageing is becoming a growing concern, a number 
of new indicators measuring the consequences on economic and 
financial sustainability and intergenerational fairness have been 
suggested by the research community. The increasing number of 
measurement tools has also led to efforts to survey them. Fol-
lowing this stream, we have established a taxonomy of over 80 
indicators in order to find overlaps and connections as well as 
to facilitate the invention of new indicators. The development of 
new statistical standards, such as the National Transfer Accounts, 
as well as newly opening datasets, will likely lead to further in-
ventions, which in turn will most likely revise exploratory tools 
such as our taxonomy. At this stage, our main conclusions can 
be summed up in two points. First, we found that the same type 
of indicator measured at different levels – such as the general 
government, the (market) economy or the total economy, which 
includes both the market economy and the household economy 
– often leads to different conclusions. A family of related indica-
tors frequently can tell more than a single indicator. The quest 
for the best indicator may turn out to be the quest for the best 
indicator family. Secondly, we found that conclusions on sus-
tainability and intergenerational fairness derived from indicators 
limited to the “visible” world of current statistical standards can be 
misleading. The value of investments in human capital or intra- 
familial transfers of cash and time are so important in this field 
that they frequently change and sometimes even revise the results 
of the analysis. Ignoring them can lead to misleading conclusions.
Notes
1 We are grateful for comments by (in alphabetical order)  Alexia 
Fürnkranz-Prskawetz, Bernhard Hammer, Miguel Sánchez 
Proper inter­cohort comparisons require data covering 
the entire life cycles of the cohorts in question, often 
involving the collection of retrospective information and 
projections regarding the future.
The quest for the best indicator may turn out to be the 
quest for the best indicator family.
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Romero, András Simonovits, Lili Vargha and two anonymous 
referees as well as participants of NTA workshops in Belo Hori-
zonte, Barcelona, Vienna and Mölle. The usual disclaimer holds. 
This paper was written as part of the AGENTA project. AGENTA 
(http://www.agenta-project.eu/en/index.htm) has received fund-
ing from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration un-
der grant agreement no 613247.
2 Sustainability is a broad concept including environmental and 
social issues as well. In this paper we limit ourselves to indicators 
of the financial/economic aspects of sustainability and intergen-
erational fairness.
3 Gál/Monostori 2016.
4 Fenge/Werding 2003.
5 Spijker 2005.
6 Further, our taxonomy table was also influenced by the taxono-
mies of Balassone/Franco 2000; Benz/Fetzer 2006; and Langenus 
2006.
7 Note: The table includes indicators that are specifically referred 
to in this paper. Definitions and further description are given in 
the text. Many cells appearing empty here are populated in the 
complete taxonomy table that includes more than 80 entries. It 
can be found in the online Appendix.
8 General government is a statistical term referring to the combi-
nation of the central (federal and state) government, local govern-
ments, social security and other public funds.
9 The total economy, measured by what Ironmonger/Soupourmas 
(2012) call the Gross Economic Product, consists of the market 
economy, described by aggregates such as the GDP, and the house-
hold economy, that is the value of products and services produced 
by unpaid household labour applying household facilities. Esti-
mates of the size of the household economy range between 25% 
and as much as 80% of GDP depending on calendar year, country 
and measurement method. The household economy is large even in 
industrialised countries. The sheer size and the age profile of house-
hold labour (see Vargha/Gál/Crosby-Nagy 2017) make the inclu-
sion of such estimates highly relevant for sustainability measures.
10 Miller 2011.
11 Cutler/Poterba/Sheiner/Summers 1990.
12 Although we include representatives of each main regime type 
we do not explore their differences here. Albertini/Kohli/Vogel 
(2007) and Albertini/Kohli (2013) show that private transfers 
among adult children and their parents differ along a North-
South scale in Europe. Whereas they take place mostly within 
the household in Mediterranean countries, Scandinavian children 
leave relatively early and receive net support from their parents in 
the form of inter-household transfers.
13 Vargha/Gál/Crosby-Nagy 2017.
14 Calculation of the support ratio family and other intergenera-
tional indicators was made possible by the National Transfer Ac-
counts (NTA) methodology. NTA, a new chapter in the develop-
ment of national accounting, introduces age into age-insensitive 
National Accounts (NA). In the standard form of NA, revenues 
flow among institutions such as households, corporations and 
government. In NTA they flow among people of different ages. 
NTA was established by Lee 1994a,b. The United Nations (2013) 
has published a revised manual. A comprehensive introduction 
to the method, including theoretical foundations, comparative 
results and a wide range of country-studies can be found in Lee/
Mason 2011a. NTA age profiles can be downloaded from www.
ntaccounts.org (global data) and http://www.agenta-project.eu/
en/dataexplorer.htm (European data).
15 Authors’ calculations based on data of Eurostat (population 
projection), Istenič et al. (2017) (public and private transfers), 
Vargha et al. (2016) (household time transfers).
16 SR = support ratio (see descriptions in the text).
17 Lee/Mason/members of the NTA Network 2014.
18 See also Gál/Vanhuysse/Vargha 2018, and specifically Kotli-
koff/Burns (2012) on older generations gaining ground, Van-
huysse (2013) on pro-elderly bias in public spending and Preston 
(1984) on the shifting elderly/children ratio in public transfers. 
19, 20, 21 Gál/Vanhuysse/Vargha 2018.
22 Authors’ calculations based on Istenič et al. (2017) (public and 
private transfers) and Vargha et al. (2016) (household time transfers).
23 European Union: 17 member states representing 85% of the 
EU population. Prime-age: the age bracket of 30–49 year-olds.
24 Gál/Vanhuysse/Vargha 2018.
25 Sanderson/Scherbov 2010, 2013, 2014, 2016. 
26 The arrow diagram was developed by Ronald Lee (see Lee, 
1994a; Lee/Mason, 2010). 
27 Willis 1988.
28 Lee 1994a.
29 Authors’ calculations based on the international NTA data-
base (www.ntaccounts.org) (Indonesia) and Istenič et al. (2017) 
(Germany).
30 The concept of the Silver Club was suggested by Timothy Miller.
31 The table contains entries for the European Union as a whole. 
These values are simple averages of 26 out of the 27 member states 
in 2010 (with Malta missing). Altogether 17 of them were Silver 
Club members and 7 others were on the edge. Only Cyprus and 
Ireland were still a few years away.
32 European figures: authors’ calculations based on data of Istenič 
et al. (2017). Other figures are from Lee and Mason (2011b).
33 EU: 26 member states in 2010.
34 This definition of the turnover duration was developed by Set-
tergren/Mikula 2006.
35 Non-financial defined contribution (NDC) systems of pay-
as-you-go financing imitate funded schemes in that they set up 
individual accounts on which contributions are credited. The ac-
cumulating notional wealth grows by new contribution inflows 
and a notional interest, which in one way or another is related to 
the period rate of return of the system.
36 Settergren 2001.
37 See Settergren/Mikula 2006; Lee 1994a; Bommier/Lee 2003.
38 Holzmann/Palacios/Zviniene 2004.
39 Bonin (2001), Bonin/Patxot 2004.
40  Khoman/Weale 2008.
41 Lee/Mason/members of the NTA Network 2014.
42 See the series edited by Gruber/Wise 1999, 2004, 2005.
43 Intergenerational transfers, both public and intra-familial, re-
allocate resources flowing in opposite directions, from the work-
ing-age population to children (forward) and from the working-age 
population to the elderly (backward). This connects forward trans-
fers (childcare, education, etc.) in time t and backward transfers 
(pensions, health care) in time t+1. Due to its immense data needs 
or reliance on simulation methods, most indicators of economic 
sustainability and intergenerational fairness avoid addressing this 
feature directly even though it would hold out a combined inter-
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pretation in terms of sustainability and fairness. A recent proposal, 
the human capital investment gap (Hammer et al. 2016), still in 
the experimental phase, aims at this combination by giving the 
unsustainability measure in terms of inadequate investments of 
one generation in the human capital of a subsequent generation.
44 See for instance Hills (1995) for the UK and Bommier et al. 
(2010) for the US.
45 Auerbach/Gokhale/Kotlikoff 1991.
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